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CASENOTE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS BEWARE: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT HAS UNEARTHED CERCLA'S
STRICT LIABILITY STANDARD
K C. 1986 Ltd. Partnershipv. Reade Mfg.'
1. INTRODUCTION
The hazardous waste that our society generates is an issue that Congress began attacking in the late 1970s,
resulting in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA") of 1980' With
hazardous waste becoming increasingly problematic, one common course of action for potential purchasers is to hire
environmental engineers to test the site for hazardous wastes. But when those environmental engineers shift pre-existing
contaminants in the course of their testing, should they be held liable for clean-up costs? In the instant decision, the
Eighth Circuit declined to follow the Fourth Circuit and held that environmental engineers are strictly liable for any
contamination caused during preacquisition testing.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
For more than 20 years, three chemical companies used a plot of land in North Kansas City, Missouri, to store and
blend chemicals for herbicides.3 In December, 1986, K.C. 1986 Limited Partnership ("K.C. 1986") purchased that site.4
Two years later, Hardee's Food Systems ("Hardee's") began preparations to purchase the land for a restaurant" and in
June, 1989, Hardee's and K.C. 1986 entered into a ground lease for the site, subject to several conditions precedent6
Such conditions precedent included that tests reveal no findings of contamination and that the area be suitable for
improvements for a restaurant.
In accordance with the local practices of commercial purchasers and lessees at that time, Hardee's sought a
preacquisition environmental investigation of the site and thereafter contracted with Terracon Environmental, Inc.
("Terracon"). Because a preliminary site inspection revealed "high evidence of contamination," Hardee's and Terracon
considered several proposals as to the extent and cost of further investigation. 9 The final agreement included sampling for
contamination "in an area where it may likely be present, based upon Terracon's knowledge of the site."o
Between October of 1988 and September of 1989, Terracon was on site during all or part of seven to ten days."
It installed five monitoring wells, which required boring several holes into the ground12 On September 5, 1989, Terracon
issued a preliminary environmental assessment, in which it concluded that there were "elevated levels of several
contaminants ... in the soil and groundwater samples."3 Terracon believed that these test results required "further
exploratory efforts and, most likely, remedial actions.'- 4 Hardee's then forwarded that report to K.C. 1986.
On September 22, 1989, Terracon issued its final assessment, and on that day Hardee's notified K.C. 1986 of its
election to terminate the ground lease as a result of the contamination." Terracon's final report recommended that "the
33 F.Supp.2d 1143 (W.D. Mo. 1998).
Pub. L. No. 96-510. 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601 et seq. (1994)).
KC 1986. 33 F. Supp.2d at 1146. The three chemical companies were Reade Manufacturing, U.S. Borax and Habco, Inc. Id.
Id.
s Id.
2

6

Id.

Id.
s Id
9 Id.
'o Id.

' Id. at 1147.
2 Id at 1147.

" Id. at 1146-47.
14 Id

" Id. at 1147.
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five monitor wells be properly abandoned at the site, including removing the... casing and filling the boreholes with
appropriate material." Hardee's offered to cap or remove the monitoring wells, but K.C. 1986 never responded to the
offer.' 7 Further, K.C. 1986 was advised in its copy of the final report (and again about two months later in a separate
letter), that as owner, it was required to notify the Missouri Department of Natural Resources of the contamination
findings and that Terracon would report the findings if K.C. 1986 failed to do so.'8 Because K.C. 1986 did not report the
findings of contamination, Terracon notified the Missouri Department of Natural Resources.19 In 1993, the Missouri
Department of Natural Resources and K.C. 1986 entered into a consent agreement.20 This consent agreement required
K.C. 1986 to take remedial action for the site.2 1 K.C. 1986 removed the five monitoring wells two years later.
In 1995, K.C. 1986 filed suit against Borax, Inc. ("Borax"), a former owner of the plot23 under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA").24 Later that year, Borax filed claims under RCRA and under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA") against Terracon 2 Borax
claimed that the monitoring wells that Terracon installed contributed to the contamination of the regional alluvial
aquifer.26 Specifically, Borax asserts that "because Terracon screened monitoring wells 1,2 and 5 through the nearsurface groundwater zone, high concentrations of arsenic were released directly to the top of the regional aquifer, and the
arsenic loading to the regional aquifer beneath the site increased by 17 percent.', 7
Terracon motioned the court for a summary judgment, claiming that as an environmental consultant it was not a
covered person under CERCLA because it neither operated at the site nor disposed of any hazardous material at the site.
Further, Terracon claimed that it was exempt from CERCLA liability because it was an environmental consultant who
merely conducted preacquisition testing. 9 On September 16, 1998 the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri denied Terracon's motion for summary judgment as to the CERCLA and RCRA claims.30 This Note
primarily focuses on the court's holding that CERCLA's strict liability standard applies to the disposal of hazardous
wastes during preacquisition environmental investigation.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

CERCLA is often criticized as hastily and poorly written.3 1 It was a congressional compromise of 1980, a lastminute product of an outgoing Democratic president and Congress, and a response to the Love Canal disaster32 Because
6

Id.

17 Id.
18 Id.

19 Id.
20

Id

21 Id.
22 Id.

23 There are 12 parties to this case; Borax is but one of many defendants as CERCLA cases are often multi-party lawsuits. In this case, the
owner, K.C. 1986 initiated the suit. Other parties who were originally or who were added include companies who mixed chemicals on the site,
previous owners, and Terracon. The full list is as follows: K.C. 1986, Borax, DEH Merrywood Company (the general partner of K.C. 1986).
HABCO (a defunct Minnesota corporation), Habco International, Inc. (whose principal place of business is Kansas City. Missouri). Donald E. Home
(a limited partner of K.C. 1986 and the sole shareholder of DEH), Victor A. Home, Nancy Reade Foster, British Aluminum Limited (which is
affiliated with Reade Manufacturing Company). Magnesium Electron, Inc. (which is affiliated with Reade Manufacturing Company), and Burlington
Northern Railroad Co.
24 K.C. 1986, 33 F. Supp.2d
at 1147.
25 Id. at 1146-47. The court also disposed of three lesser claims: a nuisance claim and two indemnity claims, not addressed in the text of this
Note. See infra note 100.
26 KC. 1986, 33 F. Supp.2d
at 1147.
27 Id.
28 Id. at
29 Id.

1148.

Id. at 1157.
31 See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
32 For more on the history of CERCLA, see Martin A. McCrory, The Equitable Solution to Superfund Liability: Creatinga Viable Allocation
Procedurefor Businesses at Superfund Sites, 23 VT. L. REv. 59, 60 (1998); Andrew R. Klein, Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Intermediate
Landowners: Reexamining the Liability-BasedApproach, 21 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 337, 340-42 (1997); Katherine X. Vasiliades, Encouraging
Industry in Order to Preserve Non-CommercialProperty,9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 29, 30-40 (1998).
30
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of its hasty inception, there is little congressional history; yet courts and scholars attribute two principal purposes to
CERCLA: (1) to facilitate voluntary cleanup of potentially hazardous waste sites and (2) to impose the costs of cleanup
on parties responsible for the contamination.
Against that backdrop, courts have labored over countless CERCLA cases. Nonetheless, case law about whether
environmental engineers conducting preacquisition testing can be liable under CERCLA is scant34 and Congress has not
expressly addressed the matter. Key issues that can arise with respect to CERCLA liability for preacquisition testing
include: the definition of "disposal," the definition of "operator" and whether the "innocent landowner defense" is
applicable by analogy.3 5 As the case law below demonstrates, environmental engineers easily fall under CERCLA's
definitions for "disposal" and "operator," but whether the "innocent landowner defense" applies by analogy is less certain.
A. Defining "Disposal" Under CERCLA3 6
Determining liability rests in part on whether a "potentially responsible party" (PRP
definition of "disposal." The plain language of CERCLA states that "disposal" means the:

has met CERCLA's

discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spillage, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste
into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may
enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any water, including ground waters38
Directly introducing hazardous waste into the environment is a clear example of disposal. However, more
complicated situations frequently arise, such as when pre-existing hazardous waste festers or is disturbed by a party who
was unaware of its presence. Whether these situations constitute "disposal" seems to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
Below is a synthesis of some of the leading cases on the issue of disposal.
The court in Nurad,Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, Inc. 39 affirmed a summary judgment motion holding liable
a previous owner, Hooper, who deposited hazardous substances in underground storage tanks. From some point before
1935 until 1962, Hooper used the tanks to store mineral spirits, which it used to coat fabrics in its textile finishing planteo
In 1962, Hooper ceased the textile treatment, but left the tanks underground.i The site changed hands several times
before the commencement of the CERCLA lawsuit, which involved several defendants including former owners and
former tenants. The court noted that included in CERCLA's definition of "disposal" were verbs with passive and active
43
components. Specifically, the court noted that words like deposit, injection, dumping, and placement sound like active
verbs but further noted that "hazardous waste may leak or spill without any active human participation."4 In holding

n Michael V. Hernandez, Cost Recovery or Contribution?: Resolving the Controversy ofCERCLA Claims
Brought by Potentially Responsible
Parties. 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 83 (1997). See also Kaiser Aluminum v. Catellus. 976 F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992), United States v. CDMG
Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706. 717-18 (3d. Cir. 1996), Nurad, Inc. v. Hooper. 966 F.2d 837, 840 (4th Cir. 1992).
' Though environmental engineers are not expressly mentioned within the text of CERCLA, they
are a "potentially responsible party" (PRP).
There are four PRPs in CERCLA: -(1) owner or operator of a facility: (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed: (3) any person who by contract, agreement or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport or disposal or treatment at a facility owned by a third party; or (4) any person who
accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to a disposal or treatment facility selected by that person." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
5 Further. indemnity and the factual question of whether a consultant followed the standards of the National Contingency Plan ("NCP"), which
is included in CERCLA. are other issues that naturally arise. See infra note 112 and accompanying text for the text of the NCP.
36 CERCLA adopted the definition of disposal from the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act ("RCRA") 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1994),
incorporated into CERCLA at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (1994).
n See supra footnote 34 and accompanying text.
' 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (1994). CERCLA includes the definition of disposal ofthe Solid Waste Disposal Act at 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(3) (1994).
3 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992).
40 Id. at 840-41.
41 Id.

42 Id. (See infra notes 63-88 and accompanying text on operator liability.)
43 Id. at 845.

4 Id.
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Hooper and other interim owners liable, the Nurad court concluded that to require active participation would mean
allowing an owner to "avoid liability simply by standing idle while an environmental hazard festers in his property."'
Similarly, in CPC Int'l v. Aerojet-GeneralCorp.,"4 the defendant lost in a CERCLA case with the argument that it
was not subject to liability because migrating, contaminated groundwater does not constitute disposal. In Aerojet, the
purchaser bought a plot of land that had been contaminated by a bankrupt chemical plant, whose actions "caused the
spread of hazardous substances further below the surface and beyond the site."47 Pursuant to the purchase, Aerojet signed
a consent order with the state's department of natural resources acknowledging the extensive environmental problems
with the understanding that the agency would clean up the contaminants.48 Even though the agency failed to clean up the
waste, the court held the purchaser liable for contamination, concluding that the "unchecked spread of contaminated
groundwater, which was identified in the stipulation and consent order as a problem existing at the site, qualifies as a
disposal."'9

The court in Kaiserv. Catelluso reversed a lower court's dismissal and held that an excavator can be liable for
disposal of contaminated soil.51 In Kaiser, the owner hired a contractor to excavate and grade the site of a housing
development, but in the process of doing so, the contractor spread some of the contaminated soil over the other parts of
the property. 52 The soil contained hazardous chemicals, including paint thinner, lead, asbestos and petroleum
hydrocarbons.53 The court concluded that because of the overall remedial purpose of CERCLA, a more limited
interpretation of "disposal" would "subvert Congress' goal that parties who are responsible for contaminating property be
held accountable for cleaning it up.' 4
Also relevant is UnitedStates v. CDMG Realty.55 In this case, the site, which was once part of a landfill, was
under investigation in the mid-1970s by the Environmental Protection Agency and the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection and Energy.56 Before acquiring the site in 1981, the purchaser contracted with an engineering
company to conduct soil testing.57 The engineering company bored nine holes into the ground through various waste
materials and groundwater; several of the boreholes "caved" during the testing. 58
Though no other disposal occurred during the purchaser's ownership,59 the CDMG court decided two disposal
issues. First, unlike the Nurad and Aerojet courts, the CDMG court concluded under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis that
passive migration60 is not disposal under CERCLA: "Finding it unnecessary to reach the question whether the movement
of contaminants unaided by human conduct can ever constitute 'disposal,' we conclude that the language of CERCLA's
Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, Inc, 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 1992).
759 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
47 Id. at 1273.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1278. This case demonstrates an increasingly common cause of action. The circuits are split as to whether "passive migration
constitutes disposal. See, for example, Craig May, Taking Action: Rejecting the Passive Disposal Theory of PriorOwner Liability under CERCLA.
17 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 385 (1998); Carol E. Dinkins et at, Overview: Recent Trends and Developments in Environmentaland Toxic Tort Litigation
SC64 ALI-ABA 221, 234-237 (1998); Sam Kalen, Passive Migration: A Limit to Liability, 14 NO. 4 ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG. STRATEGY 4
(1998); Joseph Lipinski, Last Owner Liabilityfor Passive Migration under CERCLA, 7 DICK. J. ENvTL. L. & PoL'Y 97 (1998); Robert L. Bronston,
The Case againstIntermediate Owner Liability under CERCLA for Passive MigrationofHazardous Waste, 93 MICH. L. REv. 609 (1994); Michael S.
Caplan, Escaping CERCLA Liability: The Interim Owner Passive Migration Defense Gains Circuit Recognition, 28 ENvTL. L. REP. 10121 (1998).
For a review of cases on passive migration, see Stanley Works v. Snydergeneral Corp., 781 F. Supp 659 (E.D. Calif. 1990).
so 976 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Brian I. Sopinski, Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. v. Catellus Development Corp.: Broad
Remedial Powers ofCERCLA Take No Prisoners,6 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 181 (1995).
s' Kaiser, 976 F.2d at 1342-43.
52 Id. at 1339.
s3 Id. at 1339-40.
s4 Id. at 1342-43. The court relied heavily on Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988) for this
reasoning. See also State of New York v. Almy Brothers, Inc. 866 F.Supp 668, 674-676. (1994) and Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments,
94 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996) for similar facts and reasoning.
s 96 F.3d 706 (3d Cir. 1996). See also Monica Shah Desai, Disposing of UnitedStates v. CDMG Realty Co.: The Case Against the Application
of CERCLA Liabilityfor De Minimis Disturbancesof Pre-ExistingContamination,6 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L. J. 200 (1997).
45

46

56

CDMG, 96 F.3d at 711.

s7 Id.
5 Id.
s9 Id.
60 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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'disposal' definition cannot encompass the spreading of waste here.' ' Second, and most relevant to the facts of the KC.
1986 case, however, the court found that drilling could cause disposal by upsetting already present contaminants, stating
that "the fact that a defendant's dispersal of contaminants is trivial may provide a ground to allocate less liability to that
defendant, but it is not a defense to liability.'6 2
B. Defining "Operator" Under CERCLA
In addition to CERCLA's definition of "disposal," understanding its definition of "operator" is equally important
in assessing CERCLA liability. Again, consideration of CERCLA's plain language and interpretative case law is
illuminative.
The plain language of CERCLA states that any "owner or operator of a vessel or facility" is liable for clean-up
costs.6 This definition is largely unhelpful because CERCLA defines an owner or operator as "any person owning or
operating such a facility." 64 As such, courts have struggled to interpret "operator,' 6 5 thus providing little guidance for
contracting environmental engineers. There appear to be two schools of thought on how to interpret "operator," both of
which relate to degree of control. The majority's approach is to interpret the term "operator" as someone who has actual
control over the facility. The minority approach is to find liability from less than actual control 6 Courts within the
Eighth Circuit have interpreted the word differently, but recent case law suggests it has adopted principally the majority
approach.
A leading example of the application of the majority view is Redwing Carriersv. SaralandApartments68 For
eleven years, Redwing operated a trucking business in southern Alabama, which hauled materials such as asphalt, tail oil,
and molten sulfur.6 9 When Redwing's trucks were cleaned out, the wastewater runoff and excess asphalt flowed directly
into pits dug into the ground.70 The property changed hands twice before a partnership called Saraland Apartments sought
the land to develop apartments.7' During construction of the apartments, a contractor graded, excavated and filled the
ground on the property, uncovering contaminated soil. 72 Under those facts, the court applied the majority's rationale on
operator liability and declined to find the partnership liable because even though the partners had the authority under an
agreement to control important decisions, they neither participated in the activities resulting in disposal nor exercised
control over the operations of the partnership. 73
Directly in contrast with the majority view, the Fourth Circuit's leading case, Nurad,Inc. v. Hooper74
demonstrates the minority approach, which imposes operator liability on parties who have the authority to control
disposal, regardless of whether they actually exercise that control. Unlike in Nurad,the Redwing court found the previous
owners liable even though they did not exercise actual control because the "authority to control the facility was present.
Moreover, the court wrote that even though the previous owners "never actively participated in the disposal of hazardous
CDMIG, 96 F.3d at 711.

62 Id. at 719.

6' 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1994).

64 Id at § 9601(20)(A).
65 One court wrote that the circular definition of"operator" "is a bit like defining 'green' as
'green."' Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy
B. Godwin Calif. Living Trust. 32 F.3d 1364. 1368 (9th Cir. 1994).
66 Carol E. Dinkins and Arthur E. Murphy concluded that the circuits are split into three categories
with respect to operator liability: the
authority to control" standard. found in Nurad (see supra notes 39-45 and see infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text), the "actual control"
standard. found in Gurlev (see infra notes 78-88 and accompanying text), and the "piercing the corporate veil" standard (not addressed herein). 6
BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS, § 80.3(3) (1998).
67 See, e.g.. East Bay Municipal Utility Dist. v. United States Dept. of Commerce,
142 F.3d 479, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
68 94 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996).
69 Id. at 1494.
70 Id.

7' Id. at 1494-95.
72 Id. at 1494.

7 Id. at 1505. citing Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107 (11 th Cir. 1993). In this case, the Eleventh Circuit expressly
rejected the Fourth Circuit's interpretation. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text, and see infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text for the
Fourth Circuit's interpretation.
7 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992). See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
" Id. at 842.
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6
substances," they had the authority to control, and hence were encompassed within the definition of "operator.'1 The
Nurad decision is often quoted, but its reasoning is often rejected.
The Eighth Circuit's approach is neither as broad as the Fourth Circuit's Nurad decision nor as strict as the rulings
of the majority of the other circuits. Courtsn generally cite UnitedStates v. Gurley 8 as representative of the Eighth
Circuit's approach. 79 In Gurley, a company leased a site located within the 100-year flood plain of a tributary to the St.
Francis River in Arkansas to refine used motor oil. 80 The Gurley Refining Company deposited acidic sludge, which
contained hazardous materials such as barium, lead, zinc, PCBs, and sulfuric acid into a pit.8' Ultimately, the pit flooded,
2
releasing 450,000 to 500,000 gallons of sludge into surrounding farmlands and into the tributary of the river8
Larry Gurley argued he was not an operator under CERCLA because he was merely an employee of the Gurley
Refining Company.8 3 The Gurley court held that an

individual may not be held liable as an operator... unless he or she (1) had authority to determine whether
hazardous wastes would be disposed of and to determine the method of disposal and (2) actually
exercised that authority, either by personally performing the tasks necessary to dispose of the hazardous
wastes or by directing others to perform those tasks.84
The Gurley court used this standard to conclude that the defendant was an operator because he had the authority to
implement policies and practices of a corporate entity, i.e., that he had "substantial responsibilities" for waste disposal.
The Redwing court included a footnote about Gurley, illustrative of the differences between the Eighth Circuit and
the majority approach.86 Specifically, the Redwing court wrote that "under Gurley, an officer or shareholder of a
corporation can only be found liable as an operator when they [sic] actually controlled the disposal of hazardous
substances at a facility;" 87 whereas, under the Redwing standard, "an individual need not have actually controlled the
specific decision to dispose of hazardous substances [to be found liable].'" Thus, one interpretation is that the Eighth
Circuit neither follows the Fourth Circuit's broad interpretation, nor the majority's strict interpretation of "operator."
In short, then, courts have interpreted the word "operator" differently. Hence, for environmental engineers, a great
deal could hinge on the circuit in which they operate. A circuit may choose to apply a standard of control, of authority to
control, or a hybrid, as the Eighth Circuit appears to do in Gurley.
C. Using the "Innocent Landowner Defense" to Apply a Negligence Standardof Care
76

Id.
n See, e.g., East Bay Municipal Utility Dist. v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 142 F.3d 479, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
7 43 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1994).
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co. ("NEPACCO") preceded and influenced Eighth Circuit's interpretation of
"operator" in Gurley. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986). In NEPACCO, the appellants, who manufactured disinfectants, leased a site to dispose of their
hazardous waste, but in addition, the company made an agreement with a nearby farmer to dispose of approximately 85 55-gallon drums of waste on
his land by way of a trench. Id. Acting on an anonymous tip, the EPA investigated the farmer's site, and found that the site had an "alarmingly" high
amount of contamination and that the drums had deteriorated. Id.
NEPACCO is similar to Gurley in that both companies disposed of waste onto another's property: NEPACCO did so through a private agreement
with a farmer, and Gurley Refining Co. did so through a lease. In finding operator liability in NEPACCO, it may appear at first glance that the court
followed more closely the Fourth Circuit's minority position, holding that a defendant was individually liable because he had the authority to control
the hazardous substances involved, though he never actually possessed the substances. The NEPACCO court concluded: "It is the authority to
control the handling and disposal of hazardous substances that is critical under the statutory scheme." Id. at 743.
But when the Gurley court clarified the Eighth Circuit's opinion, it observed that the actual control doctrine encompasses the authority to control.
43 F.3d at 1193.
so Gurley, 788 F.Supp. at 1476.
8 Gurley, 43 F.3d at 1191
82 Gurley, 788 F.Supp. at 1477
1 Gurley, 43 F.3d at 1192. Because he leased the land, only the question of whether Gurley was an operator, not whether he had an ownership
interest under CERCLA, was at issue. Id.
4 Gurley, 43 F.3d at 1193.
8 Id. at 1194.
6 Redwing, 94 F.3d at 1505.
8 Id.
88 Id.
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The third issue that aids in understanding when environmental engineers may be liable under CERCLA is the
"innocent landowner defense." CERCLA allows an exemption to liability for those who have acquired contaminated
property without knowledge of the contamination. In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA to include such exemption. The
exemption is part of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA") amendments. In relevant
portion, the SARA amendments read:
To establish that the defendant had no reason to know... the defendant must have undertaken, at the time
of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with
good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability.... The court shall take into
account any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the relationship of the
purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably
ascertainable information about the property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of
contamination at the property, and the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection89
Though the "innocent landowner defense" is not directly applicable to contractors (because they are not the
landowners), one court applied the purpose behind other CERCLA defenses to find a lower standard of liability. In
United States v. CDMG Realty,90 the court held that a contracting environmental engineer should be subject to a
negligence standard of care, instead of the traditional strict liability standard of care, inferring that such was the purpose
behind the "innocent landowner defense."
The CDMG court reached its conclusion by way of a three-part process. First, it considered CERCLA's
requirements that a prospective purchaser "undertak[e] ... all appropriate inquiry" into previous ownership and uses of the
property and engage in "appropriate inspection."1 Second, it reasoned that the innocent landowner defense would not be
effective without "appropriate" soil investigation.92 For this analysis, the court wrote that "prospective purchasers who by
diligently inspecting for contamination cause the dispersal of any contaminants will find themselves liable for causing a
"disposal." 93 To illustrate its point, the court noted that to conclude otherwise would mean that prospective purchasers
would be liable with or without buying the property.94 If they buy the property after discovering the contamination, they
will be ineligible for the defense because they will no longer be "innocent"; if they do not buy the property, they will be
ineligible for the defense because they will not be "owners.' 05 "In order to give the defense effect, then, an 'appropriate'
soil investigation cannot constitute disposal." 96
Third, the court drew from other CERCLA provisions to demonstrate that two other defenses are available only if
the defendant's actions were not negligent. Specifically, the court considered the third-party defense, which requires "due
care," and the defense of compliance with the National Contingency Plan,9 7 which is only available absent negligence98
'9 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1994). Before the "innocent landowner defense" was enacted, CERCLA only provided three defenses for
potentially responsible parties (which remain feasible defenses in addition to the innocent landowner defense). Parties could avoid liability only
where the release was caused by an act of God. war, or third parties. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1994). The third-party defense was the most commonly
invoked defense. but it is limited. It excludes (1) employees or agents of the defendant, and (2) those whose acts or omissions occurred in connection
with a contractual relationship with the defendant, and it requires the defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he exercised due
care and took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party. Id. Further, as a result of the provision excluding contractual
relationships. a landowner could not take advantage of the defense when contamination existed upon property acquired pursuant to a land contract,
deed or transfer instrument. See 42 U.S.C. 9601(35)(A) (1994) (defining contractual relationship). The purpose of the innocent landowner defense is
to allow innocent purchasers relief from liability. and the amendment provided that land contracts would not be considered contractual relationships.
See Debra L. Baker and Theodore G. Baroody, What Price Innocence? A Realistic View ofthe Innocent Landowner Defense under CERCLA, 22 ST.
MARY's L.J. I15. 119-120 (1990).
9 96 F.3d 706 (3d Cir. 1996). See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
9' Id. at 721.
92id

Id.

94 Id.

9 Id.
'Id.

96 United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 721 (3d Cir. 1996).

9 See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
9 See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
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In short, when the CDMG court addressed this issue of whether the "innocent landowner defense" can be used to
divine intent for a lesser standard of negligence in lieu of strict liability, it held that "only 'appropriate' soil investigations-i.e., those that do not negligently spread contamination--fall outside the definition of 'disposal.' Such a rule best
harmonizes CERCLA's clear intention to allow soil investigations and its goal of remedying hazardous waste sites.
D. Summary
Three principal issues aid in understanding why environmental engineers may be liable under CERCLA: the
definitions of "disposal" and "operator" and knowledge of when the "innocent landowner defense" applies. While the
definition of "operator," and to an even greater extent, the definition of "disposal" are almost uniformly interpreted
broadly by the circuits, there is a significant split in the interpretation the "innocent landowner defense."
IV. INSTANT DECISION

In response to Terracon's summary judgment motion, the court disposed of two issues arising from the CERCLA
The two main issues included 1) whether an exemption to CERCLA exists for preacquisition soil and ground
water investigation, and 2) two subissues relating to the interpretation of "disposal" and to the standard of liability
applicable under CERCLA.
Under the first issue arising from the CERCLA claim, the court found that no explicit exemption exists for
environmental engineers conducting preacquisition inquiries.101 The court noted that Terracon was unable to cite a case
that found an exemption and that Terracon was unable to point to any specific language in CERCLA that afforded such an
102
exemption.
The court next disposed of Terracon's argument that the innocent landowner status (exempted under CERCLA)
should apply to Terracon.o 3 Because it was not a landowner, Terracon did not argue that it was entitled per se to the
innocent landowner defense. Rather, it argued that this defense demonstrated Congress' desire to encourage prospective
real estate purchasers to conduct preacquisition environmental testing.10 4 The court disposed of Terracon's reasoning by
concluding that "in light of CERCLA's language, its purpose and the judicial precedent interpreting it, the court finds no
basis for implying an absolute exemption from CERCLA liability for environmental engineers who conduct
preacquisition environmental inquiries." 05
The second issue arising under CERCLA concerned whether Terracon had disposed of any waste, and if so,
whether strict liability or negligence should apply.106 Terracon argued that CERCLA's strict liability standard did not
apply because no hazardous waste was disposed during Terracon's soil testing.' In determining this issue, the court first
considered the plain language of CERCLA. Under the plain language rule, "disposal" means the "discharge, deposit,
injection, dumping, spillage, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that
claim. 00

9 CDMG, 96 F.3d at 722
"0 K.C. 1986 Ltd. Partnership v. Reade Mfg., 33 F.Supp.2d 1143 (W.D. Mo. 1998). The court also disposed of an RCRA claim, which it decided
on procedural grounds, and three lesser issues: a nuisance claim and two indemnity claims. As to the nuisance claim, the court found in favor of
Terracon. The action against Terracon was for a public nuisance, and the court required the plaintiff to demonstrate that Terracon (1) "unreasonably
interfered" (2) with "common community rights," and (3) suffered a "special injury that differs in kind, not just in degree. from the rest of the
community." Id. at 1156. The court decided that K.C. 1986 did not establish that Terracon interfered with common community rights and that K.C.
1986 did not suffer a special injury simply by having to pay cleanup costs. Id. Terracon also sought summary judgment as to K.C. 1986's and
Borax's indemnification claims. Id. The court denied summary judgment on both claims because there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether K.C. 1986 and Borax were joint tortfeasors. Id. at 1157.
"o1Id. at 1149.
02 Id. at 1148.
103 Id. The court cited the CERCLA's definition of innocent owner, stating: "the defendant must have acquired the contaminated
real property
'after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance on, in or at the facility' and 'at the time the defendant did not know and had no reason to
know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, or at the facility"' 42 U.S.C. §
9601(35)(A) (1994). See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
1' K.C. 1986, 33 F.Supp.2d at 1148.
1os Id.
'0 Id. at 1149.
107 Id.
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such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be... discharged into any
water, including ground waters." 08 Then, the court considered the allegations against Terracon, including whether it
caused existing contaminants to spread by boring holes into the aquifer, and concluded that a general issue of material fact
existed-as to whether its actions constituted disposal, thereby precluding summary judgment! 09
After it found that CERCLA applies, the court noted that the general rule in CERCLA cases is that owners and
operators are strictly liable for contamination. 0 Terracon argued it should be subjected to the lesser standard of
negligence because the innocent landowner defense is applicable by analogy'" and because its investigation was
conducted in accordance with the National Contingency Plan ("NCP").112 The court denied Terracon's argument based on
the NCP because a material issue of fact existed as to whether Terracon's investigation was rendered in accordance with
the NCP."'
Also, the court declined to adopt Terracon's argument that the innocent landowner defense justifies a negligence
standard of care. In doing so, the court rejected the reasoning of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in CDMG, which
used the innocent landowner defense to apply a negligence standard of care to a soil investigation, concluding that the
Third Circuit's reasoning"l 4 was contrary to the express language of CERCLA."' Also, in its discussion of the innocent
landowner defense, the court noted that the defense was available only for those who had no notice of possible
contamination." 6
With respect to the negligence standard, the court also declined to adopt Terracon's argument that it was not an
operator under CERCLA. Specifically, the court rejected Terracon's argument that it was not an operator because its
involvement at the site was limited in nature."' The court concluded that "the proper inquiry is not the extent of the
involvement with a hazardous waste site, but whether disposal occurred during its involvement at the site."" 8 Because
Terracon is an environmental consultant trained in detecting hazardous substances and because it prepared the plan to
investigate the site, the court found insufficient evidence that any other person was involved in the process and declined to
issue a summary judgment declaring that Terracon was not an operator." 9
In summary, the court found 1) that there is no exemption for environmental engineers under CERCLA, 2) that it
could not issue a summary judgment as to whether Terracon caused disposal of hazardous substances, 3) that a fact issue
precluded summary judgment as to whether Terracon followed the NCP, 4) that Terracon met CERCLA's definition of
operator, and (5) that CERCLA's strict liability standard applies to preacquisition environmental testing.

os Id.. citing 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1994). See supra notes 36-62 and accompanying text.
09 Id. at 1149-50.

0 K. C. 1986. 33 F.Supp.2d at 1150.

Id.
112Id. The text of the NCP reads as follows: -No person shall be liable under this subchapter for costs or damages as a result of actions taken or

omitted in the course of rendering care, assistance, or advice in accordance with the National Contingency Plan ... or at the direction of an on scene
coordinator appointed under such plan, with respect to an incidence creating a danger to public health or welfare or the environment as a result of any
releases of a hazardous substance or the threat thereof. This paragraph shall not preclude liability for costs of damages as the result of negligence on
the part of such persons' 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1) (1994).
K.C 1986. 33 F.Supp.2d at 1150.
'4
K. C. 1986. 33 F.Supp.2d at 1151. The case the court considered was United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706 (3rd Cir. 1996). See
supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text and notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
"s Id. The CERCLA language that the court considered contrary to CDMG read as follows: "Notwithstanding any other provision or rules of law
and subject only to the defenses set forth in the statute** those who dispose of hazardous waste shall be strictly liable for the cleanup. 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a) (1994).
6 K.C. 1986. 33 F.Supp.2d at 1152. "If the history reveals no owner or uses to which the land was put that would alert a reasonable person in the
prospective purchaser's position of the possibility of hazardous waste contamination, an appropriate inquiry has been made, and the purchaser likely
will be deemed an innocent owner" [sic].

"' Id. at 1153.
"8 Id., citing United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188 at 1193 and CDMG, 96 F.3d at 709.
"9 K.C 1986, 33 F.Supp.2d at 1153-54.
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V. COMMENT

The KC 1986 court's decisions to deny summary judgment in favor of Terracon on the issues of "disposal" and
"operator" liability are based on well-founded precedent. Courts have consistently construed both terms broadly per
Congress's express purpose,12 0 so the KC. 1986 court's decisions on these issues were predictable. However, its decision
to decline to apply by analogy the negligence requirement on the part of contracting environmental engineers in
preacquisition testing is a bit more surprising.
On the issue of "disposal" the Eighth Circuit's interpretation was in line with other courts' interpretations, and the
court was therefore correct in denying a summary judgment in favor of Terracon.12 1 The KC. 1986 court could cite other
courts that were faced with tough "disposal" interpretations, including that there be no requirement of active participation
and that soil excavation and grading, which entails spreading already existing contamination, can trigger CERCLA
liability.' 22 Finally and most relevant to the instant decision, the Eighth Circuit had precedent to find that drilling could
cause disposal by upsetting already present contamination.123
Similarly, the KC 1986 court's interpretation of "operator" liability is in line with the Eighth Circuit's precedent.
Specifically, the court sought guidance from Gurley and reasonably required that an operator have authority to make
decisions about hazardous waste disposal and actually exercise that authority.' 24 The court correctly noted that Terracon
had experience with hazardous waste and that the level of involvement (only parts of 7 to 10 days) was irrelevant per
precedent. Given the Eighth Circuit's precedent, and given Terracon's experience, the K.C. 1986 court's decision on this
point was also clearly correct.
In rejecting the CDGMi 25 court's precedent with respect to allowing a negligence standard for liability, the Eighth
Circuit stood strictly by the plain language of the statute, where it could have continued a trend of requiring negligence for
liability in certain circumstances. As such, whether the court's decision on this point is the best policy is debatable.
There are strong policy reasons to support either the CDGMor the KC. 1986 decision. The Eighth Circuit's
reasoning encourages safe testing, with an eye towards preventing the disturbance and spread of contamination. Further,
the Eighth Circuit's reasoning is also consistent with CERCLA's purpose of punishing those who contribute to
contamination, regardless of the extent of contribution. However, those engineers in the CDGMjurisdiction may exercise
free and unfettered, and thus more extensive, investigations prior to purchase. Presumably such preacquisition
investigations would lead to earlier discovery of contamination and therefore an easier assignment of liability.
Conversely, under the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit, engineers might be less willing to conduct investigations,
particularly in those cases where they know the site is likely to be contaminated, i.e., and those cases that are most in need
of environmental investigation. Even if environmental engineers competently conduct testing, the result of their findings
of contamination may ultimately mean that they automatically be named a party in the lawsuit because of the strict
liability standard. The parties involved in the litigation, particularly those who are presumably primarily responsible for
the contamination, have every incentive to pass along liability, even if they are shedding only a small percentage of that
liability. Further, the parties can easily do so due to CERCLA's broad purpose and history of enormous multi-party
litigation.
The KC. 1986 decision also demonstrates that environmental engineers cannot likely win on summary judgment
because there is an issue of material fact, i.e., whether and to what extent their actions contributed to the contamination.
Because they can easily be named in a suit, and because they cannot win on a summary judgment motion, litigating the
matter will be costly, and thus preacquisition testing will become more expensive. As a result, increased costs of
preacquisition testing may mean that those areas which are likely contaminated will not be tested. Further, many areas
could be ripe for development with simple or no remedial action but remain undeveloped.
The result of the Eighth Circuit's decision is logically based on the plain language of CERCLA, but perhaps it is
time for that plain language to be amended to include a negligence standard of liability for those who conduct
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 36-62 and accompanying text.
122 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
123 See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
124 See supra notes 55-62 and 90-99 and accompanying
text.
12s See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
120
121
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preacquisition testing. To allow the strict liability standard to remain may result in reducing the incentive for potential
purchasers to pay for thorough testing and for environmental engineers to conduct thorough testing. Congress has
allowed the negligence requirement for a finding of liability where public policy dictates it is best, e.g., in the innocent
landowner defense. 26 Placing a negligence requirement on preacquisition testing is likewise a better policy rationale in
that it ultimately leads to placing the liability on those persons who by their actions most deserve to pay the cleanup costs,
rather than on those who exercise due care in determining whether there will be any cleanup costs.
VI. CONCLUSION

In summary, because preacquisition testing in large part determines whether CERCLA liability is present, it is
best to afford those investigators the standard of negligence rather than strict liability. To do otherwise may ultimately
mean that economic development will be hindered because salvageable property will sit vacant. The plain language of
CERCLA as it stands encourages courts to use the strict liability standard instead of applying the innocent landowner
defense by analogy. Therefore, Congress should remedy this by once again amending its hastily enacted statute to allow
for ascertainable and comprehensive investigations.
SUSAN MURPHY

4A
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See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
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